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ABSTRACT 
The year 1990 saw the introduction of individual transferable quota rights to the NZ rock 
lobster fishery. This paper presents an analysis of the evolution of profitability in five 
different quota management areas over the period 1990-2001. The bio-economic model of an 
optimal fishery provides the basis for econometric analysis. The rate of profit return in each 
region was regressed on the corresponding real interest rate and the marginal stock effect. 
Evidence is found for the existence of optimal fishery. In general the half-life value of each 
region’s rate of profit return is trending towards its mean value. Significant individual 
monthly effects are also evident when we regress the rate of profit return on a time trend and 
monthly dummy variables. 
 
Keywords: quota prices, time series, half-life; convergence 
INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand rock lobster fishery consists of two species: the red rock lobster (Jasus 
edwardsii) which accounts for most of the total landings; and the packhorse rock lobster 
(Sagmariasus verreauxi) which is relatively rarer. Development of New Zealand’s rock 
lobster fishery over the period 1963-1983 was fueled by government structural policies 
designed to encourage growth. Government supplied financial incentives and a regulatory 
environment aimed at encouraging development. Throughout this period no explicit value 
attached to the permit needed to harvest lobster. Any positive implicit rents attached to the 
right created an incentive for firms to enter the fishery and compete for rent. As theory 
predicts, the number of vessels increased as did harvesting power, which eventually led to 
biological and economical decline. 
 
The quota management system (QMS), based on transferable harvesting rights operating 
within the constraints of sustainable yield, was introduced into the rock lobster fishery on 1 
April 1990. Figure 1 shows New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone divided into 10 quota 
management areas (QMAs). Rock lobster stocks (labeled CRA) are managed on a QMA basis. 
Legislation directs the Minister of Fisheries to set a total allowable catch (TAC) for each 
QMA that moves each stock towards maximum sustainable yield. The TAC is further 
partitioned into a total allowable commercial catch (TACC), and allowances made for 
recreational harvest and Maori customary harvest. This research is based solely on CRA 
QMAs 1-5. 
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Figure 1: Rock lobster quota management areas 
 
Whenever an adjustment is made to the TAC the TACCs and allowances for non-commercial 
harvest are re-assessed accordingly. The following Figure 2 illustrates the changes in TACCs 
(measured in tonnes (t)) for each of the 5 CRA QMAs through 2002. 
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Figure 2: TACC (t) for Jasus edwardsii in CRA QMAs 1-5 
 
Under the reformed structure, a quota right has economic value that is co-determined by 
harvesting costs, the market price of fish, and management decisions. This mechanism not 
only reduces individual incentives to “race for fish”, it also avoids the potential inefficiency 
and inequities associated with fixed quota holding by allowing catching rights gravitate to 
their most highly valued commercial use. Initially ITQ rights were issued in perpetuity and 
specified in terms of weight, transferability, divisibility as well as transformability (Sharp,   
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2004). In 1992 ITQ rights were redefined as “share rights” where individual owned a 
percentage share of the annual TACC set by the Ministry. Duration, divisibility and 
transferability were not changed. 
 
New Zealand is among several other countries in the world including Canada, Australia and 
Iceland that have implemented ITQ rights based fishery management system. The 
performance of ITQ system has been monitored constantly to determine whether it has led to 
changes in a reduction in fishing effort or an improvement in profitability. Before the 
introduction of QMS, the fishery was regulated by input controls, including minimum legal 
size restrictions, a prohibition on the taking of berried females and soft-shelled lobsters, and 
some local area closures. Most of the input controls have been preserved in the fishery but the 
limited entry provisions were replaced by allocation of ITQ to the previous licence holders 
based on catch history (Sullivan, 2004). 
 
Improvement in the vulnerable biomass, which can be loosely referred to as the total size of 
fish stock, contributes to one of the significant sources in economic growth (Sharp and Jeffs, 
2004).  The intuition here is simple because a larger biomass level over time ceteris paribus 
reduces the fishing cost associated with one unit of catching, in other words, it leads to an 
enhancement in the catch per unit effort (CPUE) that is measured in terms of kilograms per 
pot lift. More recent trends in the vulnerable biomass show evidence of slight bounce back 
since the ITQ system was introduced (see Figure 3 below). This paper examines the trend in 
profitability and uses quota market data to see if the rate of return in the fishery tracks the 
opportunity cost of capital in the economy. 
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Figure 3: Estimated vulnerable biomass for Jasus edwardsii in CRA QMAs 1-5 (Data source: 
Sharp and Jeffs, 2004). 
 
THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
Consider a fishery with single species fishery, namely, rock lobster in a discrete time format. 
Denote the fish stock or biomass level at time t as B(t). According to Hartwick and Olewiler 
(1986), the equilibrium condition of a sustainable fishery is to satisfy that the change in the 
fish stock, F[B(t)], must exactly equals to the harvest, H(t), over the same time interval. The 
biological mechanism from one period to the next can be written as 
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B(t+1) = B(t) + F[B(t)] – H(t)              (2.1) 
Equation (2.1) can be re-arranged in terms of H(t) as 
H(t) = F[B(t)] – [B(t+1) – B(t)]             (2.2) 
Equation (2.2) can be interpreted as the amount of harvest at equilibrium equals to the 
difference of the instantaneous growth in fish population at time t and the actual change in the 
fish stock from one period to the next. 
 
Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) define U[H(t)] as the total benefit derived from harvest and  
C[H(t), B(t)] as the cost function of harvesting fish which depends on the amount harvested as 
well as the fish stock. Within a given time interval, the net benefit for harvest is U[H(t)] - 
C[H(t), B(t)]. Taking into account of the positive discount rate (r), the optimal fishery 
equilibrium is determined by maximizing the sequence of net benefit (Π) subject to the state 
equation (2.2). That is, 
Arg Max {Π = U[H(0)] – C[H(0),B(0)] + (1/1+r){U[H(1)] – C[H(1),B(1)]} + …+ 
 (1/1+r)
n{U[H(n)]  –  C[H(n),  B(n)]}  +…}      (2.3) 
  Subject to   H(t) = F[B(t)] – [B(t+1) – B(t)] 
  For    t = 1,…, n 
The Hamiltonian function is solved by substituting equation (2.2) into equation (2.3), 
differentiating with respect to B(t), and setting each derivative equal to zero. To simply the 
expression, let V(t) equal to  )] ( ' ) ( ' [ t C t U − , and the following equation represents the 
equilibrium condition within the fisheries that maximizes the economic value of harvesting 
under the resource constraint for any two periods, t and t +1: 
(t)
(t) 1) (t
v
v v − +
+  (t)
[B(t)] 1)F' (t
v
v +
+  ) t (
)] t ( B ), t ( H [ CB v  = r       ( 2 . 4 )  
The first term in equation (2.4) indicates the percentage capital gain (or loss) - the change in 
net profits received from the fishery - from period t to t + 1. For the owner with private quota 
rights, V(t) is the rent per unit of harvest at period t. The second term is the value of one 
additional unit of biomass (or stock) utilized by the fishery, the term F’[B(t)] shows the 
physical growth in the fish stock in period t. The third term captures the stock externality. It is 
obvious that the cost of harvesting is positively correlated with harvest but negatively 
correlated with the entire biomass level available. The optimality condition described by 
equation (2.4) is stated as: “… along a potentially optimal path, a rate of harvest must be 
chosen such that the sum of the capital gain plus the marginal stock effect minus the stock 
externality must be set equal to the interest rate” (p.271). (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986). 
 
THE DATA 
Four data sets were collected: monthly recorded annual lease prices per tonne of rock lobster 
quota (LPit), asset prices per tonne of quota (APit) as well as the 90-day bank bill rates (Xt) 
covering the period starting from April 1990 to August 2001. Quota leases convey a right to 
harvest a given quantity of rock lobster in any one season. Lease prices are used as a measure 
of annual profit. Asset price, on the other hand, is the value of a right to harvest a share of the 
TACC in the perpetuity. At the time of sale, asset price is a measure of the present value of 
future profit per tonne. Prices from the five QMAs are used. Quota trades are reported to the 
Ministry of Fisheries at the time of sale. Table 1 provides a summary of trading activity in 
each rock lobster QMA, including the mean values in a particular month for each category 
with the standard deviation in parentheses.  Data ranges start from Apr 1990 to Sep 2001 for 
most QMAs. 
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Table 1: Summary of trading activity 
 
  CRA 1  CRA 2  CRA 3  CRA 4  CRA 5 
Monthly trades 
(number) 
0.91 
(1.32) 
2.16 
(2.73) 
2.04 
(3.39) 
2.64 
(2.88) 
2.00 
(2.12) 
Monthly trades 
(tonnes) 
1.40 
(3.06) 
3.08 
(4.62) 
5.53 
(11.09) 
7.94 
(11.94) 
4.15 
(5.59) 
Total trade 
(NZ $) 
110,998.20 
(202,516.11) 
365,145.16 
(568,675.94) 
679,280.49 
(3,028,102.77) 
887,999.44 
(1,635,086.37) 
294,156.48 
(448,795.29) 
 
The above data indicate that trading activity, both in tonnage and monetary terms, is highest 
in CRA 4. By contrast, CRA 1 records the lowest level of activity. In some months, 
particularly April and November, when fishing activity is high a large number of trades occur; 
in other months, the number of data recorded may be much less or even none. The linear 
interpolation method was employed to address this issue by taking the average of the month 
with multiple data or filling any gaps by adding up the averaged increment value. During the 
same time period, the estimates of vulnerable biomass (Bit), which is a measure of the fish 
stock that can be potentially harvested, for rock lobster were obtained from recent stock 
assessments (Sharp and Jeffs, 2004). 
  
Lease price provides us with a measure of the annual expected profit, assuming of course that 
quota owners exercise their right in the pursuit of profit. The ratio LPit / APit is used as a 
measure of the rate of profit return and this ratio is denoted as Yit. Because the lease price of 
quota rights is also influenced by the expected cost of fishing, it is therefore reasonable to 
assume that Yit captures the effect of stock externality on cost as well since we can not 
directly observe the cost function in the rock lobster industry. Vulnerable biomass (Bit) 
interacts with Yit as shown in equation (2.4).  
 
Since the biomass data are available as annual time series, prior to estimating the additional 
value of biomass (Wit) which is the second term in the LHS of equation (2.4), we  annualize 
the lease price and estimate the calculate the additional value of the biomass according to: W(t) 
=
) (
) ( ) 1 (
*
) (
) 1 (
t B
t B t B
t LP
t LP − + +
. Only 11 observations were obtained in each of the five regions. 
Other data Yit, Xt are annualized separately by simply taking the annual average of each as 
well to maintain a consistency with the rest of the analysis. Summary statistics are provided in 
the Appendix, Table A1. 
 
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
The aim of this paper is see if the time series of CRA quota prices in 5 QMAs provides any 
evidence of economic optimality. We use two approaches in an attempt to find evidence of 
that suggests the evolution of an optimal fishery. 
a)  Because biomass estimates are annual, the first regression uses a relatively small data 
set and tests the hypothesis that there is no connection between rate of profit and the 
cost of capital. This regression also enables us to estimate the half-live for each fishery.   
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b)  The full data set, using monthly observations, is used to test for the existence of a time 
trend while controlling for seasonal monthly effects. 
The null hypothesis is that the data reveal the NZ rock lobster industry has been trending to 
the optimal path (equation (2.4)), as suggested by Hartwick and Olewiler (1986), since the 
ITQ reform in year 1990. 
 
Regression 1:   eit Wit i xt i i yit + γ + β + α =  
                       uit e 1 it i eit + − ρ =  
We test the following: 
 H o: β>0; γ<0. 
 H A: otherwise. 
Regression 1 is a simple OLS that regresses the rate of profit return(Yit) on the real interest 
rate(Xt) and the value of one additional unit of biomass(Wit) with its residual following an 
AR(1) process. Starting from the underlying economic theory in the case of economic 
optimality within the rock lobster industry, i.e., when the null hypothesis is true, we expect 
the values of β to be significantly positive and the values of γ to be significantly negative. 
Intuitively, we can consider the rate of profit return in rock lobster harvesting has a positive 
relationship with the rate of capital market return plus a risk factor which negatively 
correlates with the biomass level, larger fish stock lowers the risk of harvest that in turn 
reduces the magnitude of risk premium between the two investment alternatives. 
 
The value of ρ enables us to calculate the half-life for each region by adopting the half-life 
formula-
) ln(
) 5 . 0 ln(
) (
ρ
ρ = H . Half-life measures the speed of convergence to the mean value of 
rate of profit return, i.e., E(Yit) it is the time required for any deviation from E(Yit) to dissipate 
by one half (Choi, et al., 2004). The value of E(Yit) in question is influenced by both Xt and 
Wit. In the case of the AR(1) process, this measure allows a comparison among regions  
in terms of the speed of convergence to the expected rate of profit return. The estimated 
coefficients of Xt and Wit along with half-life values obtained are listed in Table 2. A one-
sided t-test with 5% significance level was carried out to check the sign and significance of β 
and γ. 
Table 2: Regression 1 Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
∧
β  
t-stat p-value
(one-
sided) 
i
∧
γ  
t-stat p-value
(one-
sided) 
i ρ ˆ   H( i ρ ˆ ) 
CRA 1  0.9904 0.7711 0.2314 -4.1652  -1.3127 0.1129 -0.1268  N/A 
CRA 2  0.0045 0.0093 0.4964 0.4669 3.6821 0.0031 0.4351 0.8330 
CRA 3  -0.0308 -0.0618 0.4760  1.9631 2.2006 0.0277 0.5885 1.3074 
CRA 4  1.1997 2.2070 0.0292 -5.8755  -1.9624 0.0427 0.3442 0.6499 
CRA 5  0.5960 0.7152 0.2474 -2.3151  -0.5556 0.2969 0.2465 0.4949   
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Table 2 can be summarized as: 
a)  The signs hypothesized β > 0 and γ < 0 were evident in CRA 1, CRA 4, and CRA 5; 
the coefficients were significant for CRA 4.  
b)  We reject the null hypothesis γ < 0 for CRA 2 and CRA 3. 
c)  We reject the null hypothesis β > 0 for CRA 3. 
We find evidence in support of the Hartwick-Oleweiler optimality condition in CRA 4. 
 
Granger causality tests were run on the entire data for each QMA and are reported in Table 3. 
Although the causality test is somewhat ambiguous for CRA 4, some consistency is evident in 
the data to support a conclusion that CRA 4 and CRA 5 are trending toward the Hartwick-
Olewiler optimality condition. 
 
Table 3: Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
  N  y2t does not GC x2t x2t does not GC y2t 
CRA 1  129 0.3978 
(can’t reject) 
0.9304 
(can’t reject) 
CRA 2  134 0.8606 
(can’t reject) 
2.8772** 
(reject) 
CRA 3  131 0.0204 
(can’t reject) 
0.1870 
(can’t reject) 
CRA 4  134 3.4437** 
(reject) 
5.8276*** 
(reject) 
CRA 5  134 0.5102 
(can’t reject) 
3.0038** 
(reject) 
Note: variable lagged by 2  
 
The half-life estimated for CRA 4 and CRA 5 are 0.6499 and 0.04949 respectively. Based on 
the estimated half-life H(ρ) the rate of profit return in most regions is converging to its 
expected value following any shock - only CRA 1 did not give positive values of half-life. 
The ranking in the two sets of H( i ρ ) vary dramatically, for instance, the half-life value for 
CRA 5 is the lowest, bearing in mind that the non-linear feature in H( i ρ ) implies any small 
variation in ρ values will inevitably lead to a significantly disproportional change in H( i ρ ). 
 
Table 4: Estimated CPUE (kg/potlift) for each CRA QMA for the nine most recent fishing 
years. (Data source: Ministry of Fisheries) 
 
Fishing 
Year 
CRA 1  CRA 2  CRA 3  CRA 4  CRA 5 
1995-96  0.94 0.69  1.30  0.86  0.49 
1996-97  0.94 0.83  1.76  1.03  0.56 
1997-98  0.88 0.85  2.18  1.24  0.78 
1998-99  1.04 0.91  1.63  1.31  0.89 
1999-20  1.09 0.71  1.56  1.27  1.00 
2000-01  1.17 0.71  1.19  1.26  1.16 
2001-02  1.30 0.56  0.95  1.06  1.27 
2002-03  1.20 0.44  0.73  1.09  1.26 
2003-04  1.22 0.43  0.63  1.14  1.39 
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An independent view of time trend is provided by Table 4 which shows the estimated catch 
per unit effort measured in kilograms per pot lift for CRA 1 to CRA 5 from fishing year 1995 
to 2003. From 1995 on the CPUE of CRA 1, CRA 4, and CRA 5 has increased. In contrast, 
the CPUE for CRA 2 and CRA 3 has decreased relative to 1995. These trends are in general 
support of the earlier regression results. 
 
Turning to the time trend, and within season effects, we estimated regression 2: 
Regression 2:  uit Dumi i Ti i yit + β + α =   
Where  T i   is the time trend that starts from zero till the end of observations; and 
)' 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ( Dumi =   
  Regression 2 enables us to explore any time trend or seasonal patterns in the period of 
interest for which the data are available from year 1990 to 2001 across 5 different CRA 
QMAs. The monthly dummy variable (Dum) is a twelve by one vector which assigns an 
integer number from zero to eleven to each month starting from April to March, i.e., April 
equals zero… March equals eleven.  
 
The econometric results at 5% significance level are shown in Table 5 below, with the signs 
of each coefficient shown in brackets. The first null hypothesis, that there is no significant 
time trend over the period 1990-2001, was rejected for all five QMAs. All the time trend 
coefficients are of negative indicates a decline in the rate of profit in the last decade across all 
five QMAs. 
 
Table 5: Econometric results 
QMA  1. Ho: αi= 0  2. Ho :  βi  = 
0 
3. (Wald Test) Ho:  βi0 =  βi4        
CRA1  Reject Ho  
( -ve) 
Reject Ho 
( +ve) 
Cannot reject Ho 
CRA2  Reject Ho 
( -ve) 
Reject Ho 
( +ve) 
Reject Ho 
CRA3  Reject Ho 
( -ve) 
Reject Ho 
( +ve) 
 Reject Ho 
CRA4  Reject Ho 
( -ve) 
Reject Ho 
( +ve) 
Reject Ho 
CRA5  Reject Ho 
( -ve) 
Reject Ho 
( +ve) 
Cannot reject Ho 
 
Each monthly dummy coeffient βi  indicates the average rate of profit return for that particular 
month. Once again the second null hypothesis, of there being no within-season differences in 
the rate of profit, was rejected in all five QMAs. Furthermore, positive average monthly 
returns were reflected through the positive signs in monthly dummy coefficients. Figure 3 
below was plotted after obtaining the seasonal dummy coefficients βi  in each of the five 
QMAs. From this graph we can observe that most QMAs experienced both highs and lows in 
terms of profit return in an average fishing year. This phenomenon is more marked in regions 
CRA 2, 3 and 5.    
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Figure 3: Average monthly profit return for CRA QMAs 1-5 1990-2001 
 
This finding accords with Sharp and Jeffs (2004) regarding the shift in the seasonality of 
catch-landing over the months of June, July, August, September and October. They observed 
the catch in the same period accounted to 43.5% of the annual aggregated catch in 1990-1991 
and this number increased to 63% in 2002-2003. They suggest that this seasonal shift may be 
in response to the implementation of the extended closure of the major rival spiny lobster 
fishery in Western Australia from 1 July to 14 November since 1978 in order to capture the 
higher market premium in that season for rock lobster. However, one could argue from the 
Table 6 below that, on a longer time period horizon the general catching activities in April is 
still among the highest for all the five CRA QMAs over the entire time period of interest. 
 
Table 6: The averaged volume of trade (t) taken place in each month, 1990-2001 
  CRA 1  CRA 2  CRA 3  CRA 4  CRA 5 
Apr  2.73  7.81 13.73 25.93 7.98 
May  1.06  3.57  8.13 9.15 7.08 
Jun  2.06 4.27  6.52  10.94  5.59 
Jul  2.01  3.95  6.78 7.59 4.90 
Aug  1.40  1.63  3.60 6.17 3.38 
Sep  0.80  1.84  3.79 3.02 3.06 
Oct  1.06  3.28  4.21 7.50 2.34 
Nov  2.68  1.39  9.08 8.17 3.75 
Dec  0.81  2.16  2.77 2.77 3.69 
Jan  0.61  0.32  0.30 1.27 2.37 
Feb  0.52  1.67  3.62 1.63 2.22 
Mar  1.03  4.96  3.86 9.38 4.06 
 
In the third hypothesis tested, a restriction was imposed in regression 2 by setting the dummy 
coefficient for April equal to the one for August. If this Wald test restriction was in fact true, 
then the trading patterns in the two months were indifferent from each other. The test results   
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indicating this null hypothesis cannot be rejected in CRA 1 and CRA 5, therefore, in these 
two rock lobster QMAs I can conclude that the trading activities or profit levels at least for 
the month of April and August are not distinguishable at a 5% significance level. If we go 
back to Figure 3 and look closely, it is also observable from the graph that the profit returns 
data plots for April and August in CRA1 and CRA5 are scattered closely around the same 
horizontal line. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this research, we look for evidence of an optimal fishery, as developed by Hartwick and 
Olewiler (1986). In order to examine the time path of quota prices we used market data 
obtained from the Ministry of Fisheries. Datasets from five QMAs were interpolated linearly 
to cope with the problems caused by missing observations and multi-recorded observations. A 
simple OLS regression and its dynamically transformed regression were run together to see if 
the estimated coefficients are in accordance with the economic theory. By combining the two 
sets of results we find CRA 4 is the only region meets the criteria of an optimal fishery as 
suggested by Hartwick and Olewiler (1986). In general, the positive half-life values provided 
evidence of converging characteristics of the profit return ratio toward their mean value in 
most regions. The time trend model shows a steady decline in the rate of profit towards the 
cost of capital. These findings are resonant; in general, with other data collected from the 
fisheries viz. CPUE and stock biomass data. Needless to say, the fact that the modest number 
of observations involved in both regressions makes the interpretation process a bit difficult 
thus leaves the credibility of test results questionable. Further study could be investigate the 
intuition behind CRA 4’s success and also possibly search for an econometric remedy to 
minimize the variations in the two sets of estimation of half-life values (ρ) to obtain a 
convincing ranking in the half-life results across all five regions.  
 
Both datasets and econometric results revealed some seasonal patterns in trading behavior and 
profit rates: The month of April, as the start of the fishing year, unbeatably won the largest-
trading-volume award; however, as the implication from Figure 3, for most rock lobster 
QMAs July and August are the months in which firms made the most profit. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Summary statistics of datasets, 1990-2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region 
Sample 
Size(T) 
Mean SD 
Yit  Wit  Xt  Yit  Wit  Xt 
CRA 1  11  14.5138 0.1922  7.1944 14.0418 0.5182  2.1027 
CRA 2  12  8.9055 0.0716 7.1431 3.0924 0.1491 2.0981 
CRA 3  12  10.7727  0.3051 7.2171 3.6161 0.8495 2.0668 
CRA 4  12  13.2610  0.1269 7.1807 6.1607 0.2255 2.1005 
CRA 5  12  8.5143 0.1744 7.2375 3.0649 0.2273 2.1242   
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Table A2: Reported commercial catch (t) and commercial TACC (t) by rock lobster 
CRA for each fishing year since the species was included in the QMS on 1 April 1990. 
(Data source: Ministry of Fisheries) 
 
 
Fishing 
year 
 
CRA 1 
 
CRA 2 
 
CRA 3 
 
CRA 4 
 
CRA 5 
Catch TACC Catch TACC Catch TACC  Catch  TACC Catch TACC 
1990-91  131.1 160.1 237.6 249.5 324.1 437.1 523.2 576.3  308.6  465.2 
1991-92  128.3 146.8 229.7 229.4 268.8 397.7 530.5 529.8  287.4  426.8 
1992-93  110.5 137.4 190.3 214.6 191.5 327.5 495.7 495.7  258.8  336.9 
1993-94  127.4 130.5 214.9 214.6 179.5 163.7 492.0 495.7  311.0  303.2 
1994-95  130.0 130.5 212.8 214.6 160.7 163.7 490.4 495.7  293.9  303.2 
1995-96  126.7 130.5 212.5 214.6 156.9 163.7 487.2 495.7  297.6  303.2 
1996-97  129.4 130.5 213.2 214.6 203.5 204.7 493.6 495.7  300.3  303.2 
1997-98  129.3 130.5 234.4 236.1 223.4 225.0 490.4 495.7  299.6  303.2 
1998-99  128.7 131.1 232.3 236.1 325.7 327.0 493.3 495.7  298.2  303.2 
1999-00  125.7 131.1 235.1 236.1 326.1 327.0 576.5 577.0  349.5  350.0 
2000-01  130.9 131.1 235.4 236.1 328.1 327.0 573.8 577.0  347.4  350.0 
2001-02  130.6 131.1 225.0 236.1 289.9 327.0 574.1 577.0  349.1  350.0 
 
 